The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1991/91_2012/91_2012.zd1

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-2012
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JACKIE HOLDER, etc., et al., PETITIONERS v.
E. K. HALL, Sr., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 30, 1994]

  Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.
  I join the dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun
and the separate opinion of Justice Stevens, and add
a further observation about the responsibility Congress
has given to the judiciary.
  Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act calls for an inquiry
into -[t]he extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office,- but simultaneously disclaims
any -right to have members of a protected class elected
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.-
42 U. S. C. 1973(b).  -There is an inherent tension
between what Congress wished to do and what it wished
to avoid--between Congress' -inten[t] to allow vote
dilution claims to be brought under 2- and its intent to
avoid -creat[ing] a right to proportional representation
for minority voters.-  Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U. S.
30, 84 ((1986) (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in judgment).
Tension of this kind is hardly unique to the Voting
Rights Act, for when Congress acts on issues on which
its constituents are divided, sometimes bitterly, the give-
and-take of legislative compromise can yield statutory
language that fails to reconcile conflicting goals and
purposes.
  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example,
is similarly janus-faced, prohibiting discrimination
against historically disadvantaged groups, see 42
U. S. C. 2000e-2(a), (d), without -diminish[ing] tradi-
tional management prerogatives,- United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 207 (1979), in regard
to employment decisions.  See 42 U. S. C. 2000e-2(j)
(no requirement that employer -grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of
 . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin-); see
also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 480 U. S. 616, 649 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting two -conflicting con-
cerns- built into Title VII: -Congress' intent to root out
invidious discrimination against any person on the basis
of race or gender, and its goal of eliminating the lasting
effects of discrimination against minorities-) (emphasis
in original) (citation omitted).
  When courts are confronted with congressionally-
crafted compromises of this kind, it is -not an easy task-
to remain -faithful to the balance Congress struck.-
Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U. S., at 84 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in judgment).  The statute's broad remedial
purposes, as well as the constraints on the courts'
remedial powers, need to be carefully considered in light
of the particular circumstances of each case to arrive at
an appropriate resolution of the competing congressional
concerns.  However difficult this task may prove to be,
it is one that courts must undertake because it is their
mission to effectuate Congress' multiple purposes as best
they can.  See Chisom v. Roemer, 499 U. S. ___, ___
(1991) (-Even if serious problems lie ahead in applying
[`totality of the circumstances' inquiry under 2(b) of the
Voting Rights Act], that task, difficult as it may prove
to be, cannot justify a judicially created limitation on
the coverage of the broadly worded statute[.]-).